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Abstract. In this paper, we describe a vulnerability against one of the most efficient authentica-
tion protocols for low-cost RFID tags proposed by Song. The protocol defines a weak attacker as an
intruder which can manipulate the communication between a reader and tag without accessing the
internal data of a tag. It has been claimed that the Song protocol is able to resist weak attacks, such
as denial of service (DoS) attack; however, we found that a weak attacker is able to desynchronise
a tag, which is one kind of DoS attack. Moreover, the database in the Song protocol must use a
brute force search to retrieve the tag’s records affecting the operational performance of the server.
Finally, we propose an improved protocol which can prevent the security problems in Song protocol
and enhance the server’s scalability performance.
Keywords : RFID, mutual authentication, protocol, security, privacy.
1 Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is an identification technology that uses radio waves to
identify objects such as products. An RFID system consists of three components, namely a tag, reader
and server (database). An RFID tag is an identification device composed of an integrated circuit and
antenna. It is designed to receive a radio signal and automatically transmit a reply to the reader. A
passive RFID reader is a device that broadcasts a radio frequnecy (RF) signal through its antenna to
power, communicate and receive data from tags. It is connected to the server to retrieve data associated
with the connected tags. An RFID server is a database containing data related to the associated tags
which it manages [1].
The major concerns of designing an RFID system are privacy and security [2]. Insecure communication
between the reader and tag is inherently vulnerable to interception, modification, fabrication and replay
attacks [2]. One of the problems that is encountered in designing an RFID system is a denial of service
(DoS) attack. In a desynchronisation attack, which is one kind of DoS attack, the attacker tries to prevent
both parties from receiving messages. For example, the attacker can block the exchanged message(s) from
reaching the target causing the tag and the server to be unable to update their information synchronously.
Thus, the tag and back-end server cannot recognise each other in subsequent transactions [3].
Song et al. [4] proposed an efficient RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags. This protocol
uses the hash functions, message authentication code (MAC) and PRNG functions for authentication
and updating purposes. Each tag stores only the hash of a secret namely (t), and the server stores the
old and new values of the secret (snew, sold), the hashed secret (tnew, told) and the tag’s information (D).
This scheme uses a challenge-response protocol, where the server and tag generate random numbers to
avoid replay attacks. However, Cai et al. [5] presented a paper showing that Song et al.’s protocol does
not provide protection against a tag impersonation attack. Moreover, Rizomiliotis et al. [6] found that an
attacker can impersonate the server even without accessing the internal data of a tag and launch a DoS
attack.
As a result, a new version has been proposed in [7] (referred to here as the Song protocol). The Song
protocol uses the same data and processes except that the construction of the exchanged message (M2 and
M3) has been changed. In the new version of the Song protocol, Song claim that the proposed protocol
resists DoS attack by storing the old and new values of the secret and the hashed secret, thus when the
attacker blocks the transmitted message, the server still can use the recent old values to resynchronise
with the tag.
In this paper, we focus on examining the new version of the Song protocol [7]. We discover that
an attacker is able to desynchronise a tag without even compromising the internal data stored in the
tag. Furthermore, this protocol is not scalable, as the server needs to perform a brute force search to
retrieve the tag’s records, which in turn affects the server performance, especially if it has to handle a
large population of tags. After analysing the weaknesses of this protocol, we propose a revised protocol
to eliminate these attacks with comparable computational requirements.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we present the Song protocol process
in detail. In Section 3, the weaknesses of the Song protocol are illustrated. In Section 4, the revised
protocol is presented. In Section 5, we analyse the proposed protocols with respect to informal analysis.
In Section 6, we conclude and summarise the paper’s contribution.
2 Review of the Song Protocol
This section reviews the Song protocol as shown in the original protocol [7]. Notation used in this paper
are defined as follows:
– h: A hash function, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
– fk: A keyed hash function, fk : {0, 1}∗× {0, 1}l→ {0, 1}l (a MAC algorithm)
– N: The number of tags
– l: The bit-length of a tag identifier
– Ti: The ith tag (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
– Di: The detailed information associated with tag Ti
– si: A string of l bits assigned to ith tag Ti
– ti: Ti’s identifier of l bits, which equals h(si)
– xnew: The new (refreshed) value of x
– xold: The most recent value of x
– r: A random string of l bits
– ε: Error message
– ⊕: XOR operator
– ‖: Concatenation operator
– ←: Substitution operator
– x  k: Right circular shift operator, which rotates all bits of x to the right by k bits, as if the left
and right ends of x were joined.
– x  k: Left circular shift operator, which rotates all bits of x to the left by k bits, as if the left and
right ends of x were joined.
– ∈R: The random choice operator, which randomly selects an element from a finite set using a uniform
probability distribution
The Song protocol consists of two processes: the initialisation process, and the authentication process,
which are summerised below:
2.1 Initialisation Process
This stage only occurs during manufacturing when the manufacturer assigns the initial values in the
server and tag. The initialisation process is summarised below:
– An initiator (e.g. the tag manufacturer) assigns a string si of l bits to each tag Ti, computes ti =
h(si), and stores ti in the tag, where l should be large enough so that an exhaustive search to find
the l-bit values ti and si is computationally infeasible.
– The initiator stores the entries [(si, ti)new, (si, ti)old, Di] for every tag that it manages in the server.
Di is for the tag information (e.g., price, date, etc.). Initially (si, ti)new is assigned the initial values
of si and ti, and (si, ti)old is set to null.
2.2 Authentication Process
The authentication process is shown in Table 1 as presented in the new version of the protocol [7]:
Table 1: The authentication process of the Song protocol
1. Reader → Tag: r1 ∈R {0, 1}l
2. Tag → Reader: r2 ∈R {0, 1}l, M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti (r1 ‖ r2)
3. Reader → Server: r1, M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti (r1 ‖ r2)
4. Server→ Reader: M3 = si ⊕ fti (r2 ‖ r1) and Di
5. Reader → Tag: M3 = si ⊕ fti (r2 ‖ r1)
1. Reader: A reader generates a random bit-string r1 ∈R {0, 1}l and sends it to the tag Ti.
2. Tag: The tag Ti generates a random bit-string r2 ∈R {0, 1}l as a temporary secret for the session,
and computes M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti(r1 ‖ r2), then sends M1 and M2 to the reader.
3. Reader: The reader transmits M1, M2 and r1 to the server.
4. Server:
(a) The server searches its database using M1, M2 and r1 as follows.
i. It chooses ti from amongst the values ti(new) or ti(old) stored in the database.
ii. It computes M'2 =fti(r1 ‖ (M1 ⊕ ti)).
iii. If M'2 = M2, then it has identified and authenticated Ti. It then goes to step (b). Otherwise,
it returns to step (i). If no match is found, the server sends ε to the reader and stops the
session.
(b) The server computes M3 = si⊕ fti (r2 ‖ r1) and sends it with Di to the reader.
(c) The server updates:
si(old ) ← si(new)
si(new) ← (si  l/4) ⊕ (ti  l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2
ti(old) ← ti(new)
ti(new) ← h(si(new))
5. Reader: The reader forwards M3 to the tag Ti.
6. Tag: The tag Ti computes si = M3 ⊕ fti(r2 ‖ r1) and checks that h(si) = ti. If the check fails, the tag
keeps the current value of ti unchanged. If the check succeeds, the tag has authenticated the server,
and sets:
ti ← h((si  l/4) ⊕ (ti  l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2)
3 Weaknesses of the Song Protocol
This section shows that the Song protocol suffers from DoS attack and database overloading.
3.1 DoS Attack
The Song protocol aims to meet some of the main security and privacy features. Resistance to DoS attack
is one of the main security features. This is achieved by keeping the old values of the tag’s secret (sold)
and hashed secret (told) in the server database just once; they are then renewed continuously once au-
thentication is achieved. However, the Song protocol does not provide resistance to DoS attacks. Without
knowing the secret value (ti) which is stored in the tag, an adversary can easily cause synchronisation
failure by twice intercepting the communication between the reader and the tag.
The protocol will fail if the attacker intercepts the communication in this way; if the server’s message
(M3) is intercepted, tampered or blocked up to twice, the server database will have no matching data to
complete the mutual authentication, causing the DoS attack. For example, in the first access of the tag,
the server’s values (sold, told) are set to null, while (snew, tnew) values are set to specific values where
(tnew) is equal to the tag’s value (ti). If the authentication succeeds, then (tnew) and (ti) will be updated
to the same value and (sold, told) will take the previous values of (snew, tnew). However, if the attacker
blocks M3 from reaching the tag, then the server will update the server’s data and the tag will be unable
to update (ti). In this situation, the value (ti in the tag will have to match the value (told) in the database
and mutual authentication can still be achieved. Now we suppose that the attacker blocks M3 for the
second time; then the tag will also not update (ti), while at that moment, (sold, told) in the database
have been renewed. As a result, the tag’s data will not match the server’s data, causing an authentication
failure.
3.2 Database Overloading
The Song protocol claims that the server should be able to handle a large tag population without exhaust-
ing the server in identifying the tags. However, as shown in [7], the server needs to perform [(k+2)*F]
computations to authenticate the connected tag, where F is a relatively computationally complex function
(such as a MAC or hash function) and k is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, where n is the number of
tags. Hence, in every tag access, the server database has to run [k*F] computations on all its records to
find the matching record, thereby exhausting the server in the searching process and affecting operational
performance.
4 Revised Protocol
We propose an improvement to the Song protocol by eliminating the two issues discussed in Section 3. In
the Song protocol, if the authentication is achieved, the server’s data will be updated even if the matching
record is found in (sold) and (told). In the revised protocol, we propose that the updating process should
only take place when the authentication is achieved and the matching record is found in (snew) and
(tnew); otherwise, the data remains the same. The solution is based on Yeh et al.’s protocol [8] which was
designed to avoid a DoS attack found in Chien et al.’s protocol [9].
In order to reduce the number of computations required by the server to authenticate the tag, we
use the notion of indexing. This requires the server and tag to store another value to serve as an index.
The server stores a new index (Inew) and an old index (Iold), where the tag stores an index value (Ii).
The value of the index is assigned during manufacturing. In addition, the tag stores a flag value, which
is kept as either 0 or 1 to show whether the tag has been authenticated by the server or not. Moreover,
for calculating the index the server and tag need a new value (k) stored by both parties. We assume all
the operations in the tag are atomic i.e. either all of the commands or none are processed.
In the revised protocol, we use the same notation as presented in the Song protocol. The initialisation
and authentication processes are as follows:
4.1 Initialsation Process
This stage only occurs during manufacturing when the manufacturer assigns the initial values in the
server and tag. The initialisation process is summarised below:
– The server assigns random values of L bits for each tag it manages to (snew, tnew, knew, Inew) in the
server and (ti, ki, Ii) in the tag.
– Initially, (sold, told, kold, Iold) in the server is set to null.
– The Flag value in the tag is set to zero.
4.2 Authentication Process
The authentication process is summarised below:
– Reader: A reader generates a random bit-string r1 ∈R {0, 1}l and sends it to the tag Ti.
– Tag: A tag Ti generates a random bit-string r2 ∈R {0, 1}l as a temporary secret for the session, and
computes M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti(r1 ‖ r2). The tag then checks the value of the Flag:
1. If Flag=0, which means the tag was authenticated successfully, the tag will use the new updated
index which is equal to the server’s value (Inew), and sends Ii, M1 and M2 to the reader. Finally,
the tag sets Flag=1, and recomputes the value of an index Ii= h(ki ⊕ r2).
2. If Flag=1, which means the tag has not been authenticated, the tag will use the value of the
index computed in the former transaction (after setting Flag=1) which is equal to the server’s
value (Iold), then the tag transfers Ii, M1, and M2 to the reader. Finally, the tag sets Flag=1,
and recomputes the value of an index Ii= h(ki ⊕ r2).
– Reader: The reader transmits M1, M2, Ii and r1 to the server.
– Server:
1. The server searches the received value of (Ii) in (Inew) and (Iold) to find a match and retrieves
the attached tag data. If there is a match in Inew, it retrieves (snew, tnew, knew) associated to
(Inew). Then the server sets r2 ← M1 ⊕ tnew, and computes M'2 =ftnew(r1 ‖ r2) to authenticate
the tag. Then it marks x=new.
2. If there is a match in Iold, the server retrieves the associated data (sold, told, kold), and computes
M1 ⊕ told to obtain r2. The server computes M'2 =ftold (r1 ‖ r2). If M'2 = M2, then it has
identified and authenticated Ti. Then it marks x=old.
3. The server computes M3 = sx ⊕ ftx(r2 ‖ r1) and sends it with Di to the reader.
4. In case the index is found in Inew, the server sets:
sold ← snew
snew ← (snew  l/4) ⊕ (tnew  l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2
told ← tnew
tnew ← h(snew)
kold ← knew
knew← h(tnew)
Iold←h(kold ⊕ r2)
Inew←h(knew ⊕ r2)
Otherwise, if Ii is found in Iold, the server keeps the data the same without any update except
for:
Iold←h(kold ⊕ r2)
Inew←h(knew ⊕ r2)
– Reader: The reader forwards M3 to the tag Ti.
– Tag: The tag Ti computes si = M3 ⊕ fti(r2 ‖ r1) and checks that h(si) = ti. If the check fails, the
tag keeps the current values unchanged. If the check succeeds, the tag has authenticated the server,
and sets:
ti ← h((si  l/4) ⊕ (ti  l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2)
ki← h(ti)
Ii ← h(ki ⊕ r2)
Flag ← 0
5 Analysis
Due to the fact that the server updates its data after each successful authentication, the Song protocol
cannot achieve resistance to a DoS attack. In this section, we analyse our revised protocol and show that it
can provide immunity to several attacks including the DoS attack and at the same time improve the server
performance. Although, the tag’s storage, communication and computation costs will be higher than the
Song protocol, but the revised protocol appears to meet stronger privacy and security requirements.
Table 2: Computational requirements
The Song protocol [7] Our improved protocol Section 4
Tag
Sending MAC MAC
Authenticating MAC + H MAC+ H
Updating H 3H
Total 2MAC + 2H 2MAC + 4H
If x=new If x=old
Server
Sending MAC MAC MAC
Authenticating k*MAC MAC MAC
Updating H 4H 2H
Total (k+1)*MAC + H 2MAC +4H 2MAC +2H
n : The number of tags
k: An integer satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n
x: The value kept as either new or old to show whether the tag uses the old or new values of
the tag’s record
H: Hash function
MAC: Message authentication code
– DoS attack: We tend to use the old and new values of (snew, sold, tnew, told) , as pointed in the Song
protocol, to avoid DoS attack caused by M3 being intercepted. Moreover, in the proposed improved
protocol, the server can still use (sold, told, Iold) to identify a tag, even when the attacker blocks the
message (M3) more than once, and thus can reach synchronisation.
– Database overloading: Table 2 demonstrates that the Song protocol needs to perform MAC functions
on all the stored hashed secrets (tnew, told) until it finds the matched tag’s record and authenticates
the connected tag; in the improved protocol, on the other hand, the server can retrieve the associated
tag’s record directly according to the received value of index (Ii) and apply the MAC function only
on the retrieved data.
– Tag location tracking: To prevent tracking the location of the tag’s holder, the server’s and tag’s
responses should be anonymous. In the proposed protocol, the server and tag update their data after
each successful communication, so the exchanged values are changing continuously. Moreover, in the
case the authentication failed, the attacker will still not be able to track the location.
– Tag impersonation attack: To impersonate the tag, the attacker must be able to compute a valid
response (Ii, M1, M2) to a server query. However, it is hard to compute such responses without the
knowledge of (ti, ki, r2). Moreover, the current values of M1, M2 and Ii are independent from the
values sent previously due to the existence of fresh random numbers.
– Replay attack: The proposed protocol resists replay attack because it utilises challenge-response
scheme. In each session the protocol uses a new pair of fresh random numbers (r1, r2), thus the
messages cannot be reused in other sessions.
– Server impersonation attack: To impersonate the server, the attacker must be able to compute a valid
response (M3). However, it is hard to compute such responses without knowledge of si, IDi and r2.
– Traceability: All the messages transmitted by the tag are not static, they change continuously due to
the existence of random numbers and the stored data are updated after each successful authentication.
In addition, after the unsuccessful authentication, the tag’s data will not change, however, M1 and
M2 values still will be different in every session due to the existence of random numbers (r2 and r2).
Furthermore, the index of the tag is changed in both cases (successful authentication and unsuccessful
authentication).
6 Conclusion
This paper showed that the Song protocol has a security problem and a performance issue, specifically
a DoS attack and database overloading. To improve the Song protocol, we presented a revised protocol
which can prevent the desynchronisation issues without violating any other security properties. Moreover,
the newly proposed protocol enhances the overall performance, since it is based on using index values for
retrieving the data associated to the connected tags.
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